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The California Environmental Quality Act' (hereinafter CEQA)
requires that all public entities in California determine in advance
the environmental effects of their regulatory and public work
activities before decisions are made which might significantly
affect the environment and that they demonstrate why they decided
to undertake or regulate such activities as they did. The primary
purpose of this article is to make some tentative observations about
how CEQA, its guidelines 2 and the cases arising under CEQA
should legally affect the regulation of private land development by
local governments in California.
Incidental to that discussion will be a consideration of cases aris-
ing under the National Environmental Policy Act 3 (hereinafter
NEPA), which has produced many more judicial opinions. Since
CEQA is modeled after NEPA, the California courts usually
mention that cases decided under NEPA are relevant to the inter-
* B.S., 1952, LL.B., 1957, Creighton University, S.J.D., 1961 University
of Michigan, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of law.
1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21174 (West Supp. 1976).
2. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 15000-15180 (West 1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1973).
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pretation of CEQA, although one appellate court has suggested
that CEQA is designed to provide greater protection to the physi-
cal environment than NEPA and is to be interpreted accordingly. 4
What is now needed is more empirical information on the practi-
cal effectiveness of CEQA in achieving its policies so that, where
appropriate, the Legislature may modify the statute itself and so
that the courts may understand the real world of land use decision-
making in order to make their decisions effective in accomplishing
the same goals. Knowledge of the actual practices under CEQA
and, to some extent, the costs of using Environmental Impact
Reports (hereafter EIRs) is being developed. Several current
studies will be used in conjunction with particular court cases and
particular parts of CEQA.5
In general terms, it is now known that approximately 4,000
EIRs were prepared in 1974, of which 3,400 were prepared by
cities and counties.6  Of these, some 2,500 were for private
projects requiring a discretionary decision from government in
order to carry out the project. It has also been determined that in
these private project EIRs, 65% mention the impact of traffic con-
gestion, 44% air pollution, 41% aesthetic degradation (scenic views,
vistas, etc.), 32% degradation of native habitat, 32% runoff, 30%
water pollution, 25% noise from the project; from 18% down to 6%
4. San Francisco Ecology Center v. City & County of San Francisco,
8 Cal. App. 3d 584, 590, 122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1975).
5. One study to be thus used is the report prepared for the Assembly
Committee on Local Government, John T. Knox, Chairman, by an Environ-
mental firm of San Diego, California: ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS SYSTEMS,
INC., THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT: AN EVALUATION EM-
PHASIZING ITS IMPACT UPON CALIFORNIA CITIES AND COUNTIES WITH RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING ITS EFFECTIVENESS (Vol. 1 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Ass'Y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT]. Data used for this study in-
cluded that in the CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL MONITOR, published by the
State Clearing House, an in-depth review of 185 EIRs prepared by 23 cities
and counties and interviews of elected officials, agency staff and private
applicants in over 50 agencies.
Another study is the report prepared for the State Office of Planning and
Research by the University of California: PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH ORGANI-
ZATION OF THE UNIvERsiTY OF CALIFORNIA (IRVINE), THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY ACT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 1975) [hereinafter
cited as PPRO]. The study examined the practices in fifteen California
cities and counties, using the areas selected by the Office of Planning and
Research as having "innovative implementation strategies."
6. Ass'Y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 25-25b.
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review growth inducement, open space, noise impact on users,
change in neighborhood or area character, loss of agricultural lands,
school inadequacy, construction noise, traffic and pedestrian safety,
seismic hazard, ground water supply, archaelogical site, adequacy
of public services (not specific), displacement of housing, housing
provisions, construction dust, public revenue and expense, and
construction nuisance (not specific) with lesser percents for other
impacts.7
Further, in 31% of the projects, mitigation measures attributable
to environmental review were found in one study.8 From the same
source, one learns that conditions are imposed in 30% of the projects
in order to mitigate adverse impact and 4% of the projects were
denied specifically for environmental reasons,9 with some 60% of all
identified impacts being mitigated.10 How much of this is due
primarily to CEQA is questionable for it seems that compliance
has varied from substantial reform through pro forma compli-
ance,1' and in some areas the requirement has had no effect at all.12
It is equally necessary to evaluate CEQA, its guidelines and its
judicial gloss in terms of whether environmental policies and goals
should be accomplished through this type of government interven-
tion at all and whether they could be accomplished with less cost to
the public and private sectors. The costs of delay as well as the
costs of artificially induced scarcities may or may not be as exten-
sive as feared. One estimate of the average delay for an EIR is
three months. '3 For example, if it does cost one hundred and fifty
dollars per dwelling unit as one study has very cautiously suggest-
ed 14 and two to three dollars per capita, 15 this cost has to be
evaluated in terms of what is gained through the CEQA process and
ways to save costs without undermining the policies of CEQA,
assuming they are worthwhile, must be sought.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE POLICY OF CEQA AND NEPA
The statements of policy in both CEQA'16 and NEPA17 , if taken
7. Id. at 26a.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. Id. at 28.
11. PPRO, supra note 5 at HI-2.
12. Id. at 11-6. /
13. Ass'Y LOCAL Gov'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 41.
14. Id. at 78.
15. Id. at 77.
16. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2100-01 (West Supp. 1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1973).
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literally, evidence a substantial legislative commitment to both
present and future generations to attain a rational balance be-
tween man and his environment, between the use and the preser-
vation of that environment, and between health, safety and beauty
on the one hand and productivity on the other. This is particularly
true of CEQA, which provides, for example, that
it is the intent of the Legislature that all agencies . . . which
regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and public
agencies which are found to affect the quality of the environment,
shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given
to preventing environmental damages.'8
At least in part because of the strong and sweeping language of
these expressions of legislative intent, the state and federal court
opinions cited throughout this article have insisted upon implemen-
tation of the requirements of the EIR and EIS process. So far,
however, the language has been used primarily to insist upon what
might be called the procedural or process aspects of the two acts and
only limited attention has been given to the effects of the acts upon
the actual decision to be reached.
Necessarily, the injection of this new requirement into the deci-
sion-making processes of so many diverse agencies not only has
posed difficulties in implementing the process but also has created
extensive difficulties in ascertaining exactly what the decision mak-
er is supposed to do with the results of the environmental impact
report or statement. For agencies with specialized goals and ex-
pertise, the immediate response was either to ignore the new re-
quirements or to respond inadequately. For example, an agency
responsible for highways had the existing responsibility of utilizing
its expertise to assure the physical quality of the highways in terms
of the durability of the material used for the roads, the quality of
the rocks upon which the road was being built, and so on. Exper-
tise in the safety element of highway design was also needed, as
was a systematic way of dealing with other agencies, including
local governments and the general public, through the require-
ments for corridor and design hearings. Presumably the agency
considered the need for the roads and highways by measuring
existing uses and projecting population growth based upon existing
18. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West Supp. 1976).
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trends and the anticipated land use activities of other government
entities. With the injection of CEQA and NEPA into their
decision-making process, road building agencies now must accur-
ately demonstrate that they have taken into account any environ-
mental impacts, such as those upon the marine vegetation within
bodies of water through which, or around which, highways might
go, as well as the wildlife habitats and natural vegetation which
would be affected both by the building of the highway and its
eventual use; they must also take into account the growth inducing
impact of their projects. As will be shown, they may then have to
decide whether or not the growth thus induced is in some sense
desirable or not. This latter goal might be in direct conflict with
the goals such agencies formerly sought to achieve; in the past
such agencies deliberately responded by providing access based
upon expected or existing growth rather than discouraging it by
withholding a proposed highway.
The decisions of local land use regulators necessarily should
have accomplished a much broader range of goals. As a matter of
fact, their planning processes now have come to recognize environ-
mental goals independently of CEQA. The legislative concept of
local government land use regulation seems to be based upon the
assumption that initial and overriding policy decisions lie in local
general plans. These general plans must include such environ-
mentally-oriented elements as a land use element, a circulation
element, a conservation element, an open space element, a seismic
safety element, a noise element, a scenic highway element10 and a
safety element for protection of the community from fires and
geologic hazards. 20  Zoning decisions must in turn be consistent
with these general plans21 and, of course, all individual decisions,
such as issuance of special use permits, approval of subdivision
maps and planned unit developments, must be consistent with the
zoning. By this process, even without CEQA, theoretically there
should be a consistency between the environmental elements within
the general plan and all land use decisions. Moreover, there is a
requirement that the governing body deny the approval of a sub-
division map if it makes any of the following findings:
[C] that the site is not physically suited for the type of develop-
ment.
[DJ that the site is not physically suitable for the proposed den-
sity of development.
19. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1976).
20. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302.1 (West Supp. 1976).
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1976).
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[E] that the design of the subdivision or the proposed improve-
ment is likely to cause substantial environmental damage or
substantially and unavoidably injure fish or wildlife or their
habitat.
[F] that the design of the subdivision or the type of the im-
provement is likely to cause serious health problems. 22
As will be demonstrated throughout this article, CEQA and
NEPA contemplate the attainment of these environmental goals
through a publicly reviewable, rational decision-making process.
Implementation of this process is to 'be encouraged by a coopera-
tive effort among various governments which are directly or indi-
rectly involved with the particular decisions to be evaluated as well
as by citizen input. As the literally hundreds of cases under NEPA
and the dozens of appellate cases under CEQA will demonstrate,
judicial review of this decision-making process has been a major
factor in the development of such effective environmental review
process as does exist. Since the legislatures have not provided sub-
stantial funding to insure implementation of these statutes, the
actions brought in court by environmental groups and the California
Attorney General have been primarily responsible for bringing to
light failures to comply with the legislation and for forcing compli-
ance in individual instances. One cannot help but speculate, how-
ever, about the effectiveness of either the legislation or of the courts
in making CEQA an effective tool for accomplishing its policies. The
studies23 of the process which do exist reach somewhat positive
conclusions about the effectiveness of the process; at the same time
they point to the difficulties in empirically assessing the extent to
which CEQA has accomplished changes.
This author questions the extent to which legislation or judicial
decisions will change behavior. Does the locally elected cement
contractor or lumberman who has campaigned on a political plat-
form of full employment, business expansion and decreased gov-
ernment involvement in the regulation of the private sector, auto-
matically take on a new responsibility when the Legislature passes
22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65567 (West Supp. 1976). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the relationship between CEQA and this legislation, see Winters,
Environmentally Sensitive Land Use Regulations in California, 10 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 693 (1973).
23. PPRO and Ass'y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5.
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laws which run contrary to his basic philosophy about local govern-
ment control of land use? If a governmental staff or a citizens'
group raises objections about a particular regulated project because
of its potential adverse environmental impact or because of the
inadequacy of the assessment to determine such impacts, does this
influence the decision maker who realizes that the objectors lack
the resources for pursuing their objections through court processes?
Does the government attorney who realizes the same probability of
lack of challenge by effective legal representation on the other side
argue against the basic philosophy of his or her employer in order
to insist upon a full and rational implementation of CEQA?
Attempts to assess the rationale behind the land use decision-
making process in the past seem to reveal the lack of any under-
standable and coherent process for achieving even a modest degree
of rationality.2 4 Even if the decisions reached are to some extent
or in some sense "good" decisions, the lack of an unidentifiable and
reviewable process prevents an appreciation of this. Of course, the
lack of a rational process is one of the factors resulting in recom-
mendations that local government get out of much of the land use
decision-making process. 25  While recognizing some validity to
this position, the author of this article assumes that local govern-
ment attempts to preserve and protect the environment are appro-
priate and best carried out by assessing the consequences of pro-
posed decisions and systematically choosing among reasonable
alternatives.
An added difficulty with the attempts to assess the impact of
CEQA upon the decision-making process lies in what presumably
is a lawyer's common understanding of how one might approach a
situation which is essentially a negotiation setting. Surely, few
parties to the CEQA process are desirous of a lawsuit to resolve
any differences of opinion, except where delay is a tactic; reaching
an out of court settlement is generally accepted as preferable to a
lawsuit because of delays and frequent uncertainties as well as the
added cost of litigation. If developers approach the land use
regulatory process as a negotiation process and if lawyers give
advice based upon the way in which lawyers approach other law-
yers where there is a conflict to be resolved by negotiation, then
one would expect that negotiations will be commenced by the
proponent seeking more than is wanted, realizing that the negotia-
tion process will result in a trading off until a common ground is
24. See R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); D. MI'WDELKER, THE
ZONING DILEMMA (1971); and PPRO, supra note 5.
25. See SIEGAN, LAND USE WrHOUT ZONING (1972).
S178
[VOL. 3: S172, 1976] The Future of E.I.R.s
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
reached. Under this model, the developer would seek more in
terms of density or greater degradation of the environment than he
would ultimately want for his own self-interest. Then the EIR
process can produce mitigation and the imposition of conditions to
eliminate adverse environmental effects with the possible result that
the project will be carried out exactly as the developer desired. In
that process, however, it will appear that concessions have been
made and that, indeed, CEQA has had an impact.
A similar tactic would be for the developer or the consulting
firm to prepare a draft EIR which is known to be inadequate.
Public or staff review then could expose problems not alluded to in
the draft EIR and factual data could be gathered. This would
make it appear that the EIR review process has uncovered new
information and thus is doing its job, even though the proponent of
the project was well aware of these consequences and would make
no concessions at all. Once the EIR has been improved by the
addition of data, it would then appear that everything is proper.
Had the original EIR included this data, it might well be that the
staff or the public would have insisted upon further findings which
would have been more likely to result in disapproval or in modifi-
cation of the project. There is probably no way to prove whether
or not either of these tactics is being used.
III. THE EIR AND EIS-THE ACTION PRODUCING ASPECT OF THE ACT
The method devised under both CEQA and NEPA for achiev-
ing their purpose is the environmental impact report (California)
or statement (federal), an informational document which must be
considered by every public agency before taking action which
significantly affects the environment. The EIR or EIS must in-
clude a detailed statement of:
1. The environmental impact of the proposed action.
2. Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented.
3. Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the impact, including
but not limited to, measures proposed to reduce wasteful, ineffi-
cient and unnecessary consumption of energy (not expressly in-
cluded in NEPA).
4. Alternatives to the proposed action (including abandonment).
5. The relationship between local short-term uses of man's envi-
ronment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity.
S179
6. Any irreversible changes which would be involved in the pro-
posed action should it be implemented.
7. The growth-inducing impact of the proposed action (not ex-
pressly included in NEPA).26
Before it is necessary to prepare such a document, a determina-
tion must be made as to whether the project has a "significant
effect on the environment" 27 (the federal statute is worded "signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment") .28 Nei-
ther the courts nor the guidelines2 9 are very helpful in interpreting
the limited statutory definition of "significant effect" as found in
CEQA.30
Some idea of the California Supreme Court's interpretation can
be found in such statements as "[t]he very uncertainty created by
the conflicting assertions made by the parties as to the environmen-
tal effect . . . underscore the necessity of the EIR to substitute
some degree of factual certainty for tentative opinion and specula-
tion.",31
One major purpose of an EIR is to inform other government
agencies and the public generally, of the environmental impact of a
proposed project ... , and to demonstrate to an apprehensive
citizenry that the agency has in fact analyzed and considered the
ecological implication of its action. A simple resolution or nega-
-tive declaration stating that the project will have no significant
environmental effect, cannot serve this function.32
This determination must be in writing.3 3 The technique for deter-
mining that no EIR is required to be prepared is the negative decla-
ration.34 This threshold decision has the potential for effectively
undermining the CEQA policies since, in the absence of effective
public involvement or appeal processes, environmental conse-
quences may be "swept under the rug." Thus, the recommendation
has been made to make these decisions more open and available to
'the decision makers.3 5
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1973); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West Supp.
1976); (the CEQA provisions are explained in 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15143
(West 1975)).
27. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West Supp. 1976).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1973).
29. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15081 (West 1975).
30. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21083 (West Supp. 1976).
31. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 814, 108 Cal. Rptr.
377, 390 (1973).
32. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 86, 529 P.2d 66,
78, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 46 (1974) (footnotes by court omitted).
33. Id.
34. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15083 (West 1975).
35. PPRO, supra note 5, at 11-7.
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The guidelines3 provide that the written negative declaration
will normally not be more than one page in length. While one
California case3 7 has taken the view that a negative declaration need
not be in the form of a "mini-EIR," the federal cases tend to
require some consideration of each of the elements in an EIS, thus
making the negative declaration amount to a "mini-EIS." 38 In one
case39 in which the claim that there should have been an EIR was
rejected, the court considered a negative declaration which de-
scribed the reasons why there was a lack of significant impact; it
also reviewed eighteen conditions that had been imposed in order
to minimize adverse impacts as a result of consideration and adop-
tion of the negative declaration. The project in question was a 24-
mile long and eighteen-foot high fence, which was designed as an
"art form" over mostly farmland and which was to be removed
after 14 days with guarantees that the land would be returned to its
exact prior state. The court's conclusion that there was no sub-
stantial and adverse impact upon the environment may have been
stretched somewhat in order to protect an investment of $1,400,000
which might have been lost by delays while an EIR was pre-
pared. At the same time, the case suggests .that the negative
declaration and attending record demonstrated that each of the
elements of the EIR were at least informally dealt with; it may be
likely that in debatable situations the court will be willing to decide
that the less formal and complete process will be sufficient.
Recent examples of determinations that an EIR is not required
include a case 40 in which the court summarily concluded that the
closing of a residential street did not necessarily mean that there
would be a significant effect on the environment and, in the
absence of showing an impact, the Council's determination was
36. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15083 (West 1975).
37. Hixon v. County of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. App. 3d 370, 113 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1974).
38. See, e.g., Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
39. Running Fence Corp. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 51 Cal. App.
3d 400, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1975).
40. Snyder v. City of South Pasadena, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1051, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1975). The case is interesting because it appears to involve a
street closing to exclude traffic generated by another street in the City of
Los Angeles so that what was considered to be excess traffic did not go
through a residential area of the city of South Pasadena. The latter solved
its own problem by closing or "barricading" part of its own street.
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supported by substantial evidence. Another court 41 has held that
an EIR is not required for repair and maintenance of existing roads
because that is a matter properly included within the categorical
exemptions of the CEQA Guidelines. 4 2
A negative declaration may serve another purpose consistent
with CEQA which has now been formally approved by at least one
appellate case.43 The assessment necessary to decide whether or
not to prepare an EIR may disclose a negative impact which can
then be worked out with the project applicant so as to mitigate it,
with the result that the project will not have significant impact.44
This practice may severely limit public review and may put the
staff in an inappropriately powerful position.4" While many feder-
al cases 46 have considered the question of significant impact, it
remains difficult to generalize about how the line is to be drawn.
Under CEQA, there is an additional threshold decision to be
made based upon the distinction between discretionary acts, 47
which require exercise of "judgment, deliberation or discretion"
and do require an EIR, and ministerial acts,48 which require acting
upon given facts and do not require an EIR.4 9 Any doubts are to
be resolved in favor of requiring an EIR. °
41. Erven v. Bd. of Supervisors of Riverside County, 53 Cal. App. 3d
1004, 126 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1975).
42. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15101 (c) (West 1975). Other exemptions are
included within the categorical exemptions of the CEQA Guidelines. Id.
at §§ 15101 to 15115.
43. Running Fence Corp. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 51 Cal.
App. 3d 400, 430, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339, 361 (1975).
44. Ass'Y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 42.
45. See PPRO, supra note 5 at 11-6.
46. E.g., federal cases have held that: a renewal project which reduces
density in an existing building and involves only cosmetic work on the out-
side of the existing buildings and is not significant, Wilson v. Lynn, 372
F. Supp. 934. (D. Mass. 1974); 3.4 miles of single lane gravel road which
is the final connecting segment of a fire road is not significant, Kisner v.
Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310. (N.D.W. Va. 1972); a sewage treatment plant which
would improve water quality over present facilities is not significant,
Howard v. Environmental Protection Agency, 4 ERC 1731 (W.D. Va. 1972);
the mere condemnation of land by TVA for future use of an electric gen-
erating plant is not significant (a result based in part on the fact that the
use was only a "possible" future use), U.S. v. Three Tracts of Land, 377
F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ala. 1974); a 43 acre PUD is significant, Gifford-Hill
Co. v. FTC, 389 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1974); an 81-unit Navy housing project
is significant, Fort Story v. Schlesinger, 7 ERC 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974).
47. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15024 (West 1975).
48. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15032 (West 1975).
49. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1976).
50. People v. Dep't of Housing & Community Dev., 45 Cal. App. 3d 185,
119 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1975). See also Plan for Arcadia Inc. v. Arcadia City
Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974).
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One particular regulatory activity which has created substantial
controversy under this distinction is the issuance of grading per-
mits. These permits can have very substantial impacts upon the
environment, although some jurisdictions treat their issuance as
ministerial. It has now been held that grading permits do require
an EIR, at least where the city engineer has the power to impose
conditions incidental to their issuance and other aspects of the
issuance involve discretion, even though local guidelines may de-
fine such approval as ministerial. 51 It has also been held that the
requirement that zoning be consistent with the general or specific
plans5 2 cannot make a rezoning to conform thereto ministerial
because general statutes on zoning indicate that it is a discretionary
act.
55
Both CEQA and NEPA apply to any kind of undertaking or
project which will have significant effect upon the environment,
whether it is an activity or project to be carried out directly by a
government entity or is an activity to be carried out by a private
concern pursuant to a permit or other authorization by a govern-
ment entity. These acts can apply to such non-land use matters as
the use of x-ray equipment to inspect persons and baggage board-
ing airplanes, 54 the offshore oil drilling of test wells,55 and the
issuance of certificates of convenience and necessity by the Public
Utilities Commission. 56
IV. SOCIAL IMPACT AS "SIGNIFICANT IMPACT"
Although both NEPA and CEQA purport to have the goal of
providing environmental conditions in which man can "fulfill the
51. Day v. City of Glendale, 51 Cal. App. 3d 817, 124 Cal. Rptr. 569
(1975)..
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1976).
53. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67
(1974).
54. Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974).
55. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118
Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
56. Desert Environmental Conservation Ass'n v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 8
Cal. 3d 739, 106 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1973); see also Wildlife Alive v. Chickering,
53 Cal. App. 3d 808, 126 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1975) exempting the Fish and Game
Commission from CEQA when the Commission is setting hunting season
because of the court's conclusion that the Legislature's intent was to exempt
the Commission and that CEQA does not apply to legislative acts, which
the court found the setting of hunting season to be.
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social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations,"5 7 the latter limits its definition of "environment" to
purely physical concerns.5 8 Since NEPA does not so clearly limit
its concern to the physical environment and since reference is made
in a number of places within NEPA to social concerns,5 9 one of the
circuits has decided on several occasions that the assessment of
social impacts is an inherent part of the concern of NEPA. In one
such case, where an outpatient clinic for drug users, the court
required that an EIS be used for purposes of considering the effects
of the project upon the "human environment" insofar as there
might be a possibility of increased drug sales, drug use, crime, riots
and other deleterious activities within the immediate area.60
More recently, the Second Circuit has decided that NEPA re-
quires a consideration of the social impacts arising from the planned
financing of a low-income housing project by HUD within the what
had originally been planned as a middle-income housing project.
The court concluded that the federal agencies must use the EIS
process to consider the following:
Site selection and design; density; displacement and relocation;
quality of the built environment; impact of the environment on cur-
rent residents and their activities; decay and blight; implications
of the city growth policy; traffic and parking; noise; neighborhood
stability; and the existence of services and commercial enterprises
to serve the new residents.6 1
The court emphasized the need to consider alternatives to the
particular project, especially since this is required by HUD's own
regulations.
A federal trial court has required an EIS to assess the "effect of
a youth facility on the human environment in a planned residen-
tial development in close proximity to a proposed elementary
school."01 2 However, an attempt to use NEPA to assess the alleg-
edly adverse social characteristics of persons who would live in a
low-cost housing project to be financed by HUD has failed, 63 a
result similar to that reached by a California court 64 when asked to
57. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1973); CAL. PUB. RES. CoDE § 21001(e) (West
Supp. 1976).
58. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21060.5 (West Supp. 1976).
59. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(A), 4332(B), 4341(3), 4342, 4344(4) (1973),
referring to social and/or economic considerations.
60. Hanly v. Kleindeinst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
61. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1975).
62. Tierra Santa Community Council v. Richardson, 4 Env. L. Rptr.
20309 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
63. Nucleous Homeowners v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
64. City of Orange v. Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1974).
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evaluate the social effects of establishing an unemployment office.
Thus far, with the exception mentioned earlier,6 5 the California
courts have not considered social and economic impact issues. The
guidelines for CEQA require the balancing of economic and social
factors, but make the inclusion of economic information in the EIR
itself strictly discretionary.6 Both the recently added requirement
that the EIR include mitigation measures to reduce consumption of
energy67 and the requirement that growth inducing impact 68 be
included suggest economic and social considerations going beyond
strictly physical impacts. The positive aspects of social impact as
overriding considerations in connection with adverse environmental
impacts will be discussed further in later parts of the article.69
V. RETROACTIVE APPLICATIONS AND PHASED PROJECTS
CEQA specifically provides, in its amendments following the
decision in Friends of Mammoth,70 that regulatory activities as well
as public works projects are covered by CEQA, and that projects
"undertaken, carried out, or approved" prior to December 5, 1972
need not comply with the environmental impact report processes
under CEQA, except where they were under legal attack for
violating CEQA prior to that date and substantial hardship would
not follow from requiring an EIR.71 Thus, it has been held that a
conditional use permit validly issued prior to that date can not be
set aside because no EIR has been filed.7 2 However, just as NEPA
65. Id.
66. 14 CAL. ADMI. CODE § 15012 (West 1975).
67. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(3) (West Supp. 1976).
68. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000(7) (West Supp. 1976).
69. See infra note 139.
70. Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.
3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
71. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21169 and 21179 (West Supp. 1976), inter-
preted in Aries Develop. Co. v. California Coast. Zone Cons. Comm., 48
Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) and Cooper v. County of Los
Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d 34, 122 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1975); Friends of Lake Ar-
rowhead v. San Bernadino Ct. Bd. of Supr's, 38 Cal. App. 3d 497, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 539 (1974); Concerned Citizens of Palm Desert, Inc. v. Riverside Ct.
Bd. of Supervr's, 38 Cal. App. 3d 272, 113 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1974); Plan for
Arcadia, Inc. v. Arcadia City Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr.
96 (1974).
72. San Francisco Plan and Urban Renew. Ass'n v. Central Permit Bur.,
30 Cal. App. 3d 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1973); Concerned Citizens of Palm
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has been interpreted in many instances to apply to projects which
were well underway at the time the act was passed but about which
there were still substantial decisions to be made, 73 CEQA has been
applied in several instances, at least as far as public works are
concerned, to assure that even though decisions have been made
prior to the effective date, if there are additional decisions to be
made after the date, then an EIR will be required as to those
subsequent decisions. For example, CEQA has been applied to a
groundwater system for the city of Los Angeles where aqueducts
for the system were nearly completed and half of the monies
allocated for wells were spent prior to the enactment of CEQA.
The court in that case required an EIR in order to allow an
assessment of the balance of the project, including an assessment of
plans to increase the use of existing and proposed wells, which use
could adversely affect the water supply of complaining farmers.
7 4
Similarly, an EIR was required where a highway project was fully
approved by the California Division of Highways prior to the
effective date of CEQA, but for which only a small portion of
acquisition costs had been paid and for which construction funds
had not been authorized.7 5
Where a part of a project has been completed but there are still
future parts involving decision making, an EIS may be required
even though construction has proceeded so far that the project
cannot be reconsidered as a whole. The rationale is that the EIS
can still be used to shape future increments so that adverse environ-
mental impacts are minimized.7 6
On the other hand, it has been held that when a building permit
has been issued prior to the effective date of CEQA and thus is
protected by the grandfather provisions of CEQA, a subsequent
attempt to have the building approved for condominium use has no
effect on the environment as such.7 7 It was reasoned that if the
Desert, Inc. v. Riverside City Board of Supervisors, 38 Cal. App. 3d 272,
113 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1974).
73. E.g., Keith v. California Highway Comm'n, 506 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.
1973); Keith v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Northside Ten-
ants' Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Lathan
v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); Minnesota Citizens Ass'n v. AEC,
4 ERC 1876 (D. Minn. 1972).
74. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1973).
75. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Bosio, 47 Cal. App. 3d 495, 121 Cal. Rptr.
375 (1975); prior opinion at 36 Cal. App. 3d 586, 111 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1974).
76. Jacarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973); see
also, Environmental Defense Fund v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164
(6th Cir. 1972); Barta v. Barinegar, 358 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
77. Pacific Palisades Prop. Own. Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.
App. 3d 781, 117 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1974).
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conversion of an apartment to a condominium cannot be consid-
ered to so significantly affect the environment as to require the
preparation of an EIR,78 then once an original building permit has
vested, such a conversion is no different from converting an exist-
ing building to a condominium, even though demolition of the old
building and excavation has been undertaken. In making the
decision as to whether a potentially retroactive application of
CEQA is to be made, the court may look to the strong environ-
mental policies of the act and reason for application, if possible,
because of the strong public interests involved.7 9
Where two buildings were planned in the same leased area, and
the first was protected by a permit issued prior to the effective date
of CEQA, the second building was not required to be assessed in
terms of the possibility of building elsewhere, since the protection
of the first building extended to that extent to the second.80
Both the cases under NEPA81 and the CEQA Guidelines8 2
require that, in a phased project, consideration must be given to the
environmental impact of each segment of the project as well as to
the whole. Where the segment of a highway is long enough to
have an independent usefulness because it ends in logical terminal
points, it can be assessed by itself.8 3 Similarly, a reservoir which
has independent utility can be assessed independently of the bal-
ance of a ,Corps of Engineers overall river project, 4 but a dredging
project which will lead inevitably to other projects must be consid-
ered along with the other project.8 5
VI. ADEQUACY OF THE EIR AND EIS
Many of the cases cited throughout this article, as well as many
federal cases too numerous to mention, have dealt in one way or
78. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15037(a) (West 1975).
79. See Environmental Law Fund, Inc. v. Town of Corte Madera, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 105, 122 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1975).
80. Bresnahan v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 297, 121 Cal. Rptr.
750 (1975).
81. Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1972); Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
82. 41 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15069 (West 1975).
83. Indiana Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); see
also Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe, 361 F. Supp. 1360 (D.C. Md.
1973).
84. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
85. Wisconsin v. Callaway, 371 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
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the other with the question of what data should be included within
the environmental impact report or statement. For example, the
cases which deal with the threshold issue of whether or not there is
a potential significant impact 86 so that an EIR or EIS must be
prepared demonstrate the type of data to be included; those matters
brought to the court's attention as indicating that an assessment
must be made are the very matters which must in turn be adequate-
ly described once an EIR or EIS is prepared. The case law
demands that the EIR and EIS include all actual physical environ-
mental impacts that are relatively serious and have a firm basis in
fact. Of course, the extent of data required is not a question which
can be resolved by general principles, since it is essentially a
question of fact, that is, in' each instance, everything must be
considered which is actually or potentially a serious threat to the
environment. Statements of fact about the presence or absence of
environmentally sensitive wildlife, vegetation or other matters with-
in the area of the project must not be simply conclusionary, but
must be supported by studies which were undertaken specifically
for purposes of the EIS or were available because carried out by
someone else at some other time.8 7
VII. RELATIONSHIP OF THE EIR AND EIS TO THE
DECISION REACHED
Most of the judicial concern has been with issues other than the
basic and most important issue of how data on the environment,
which so far has been limited primarily to the physical environ-
ment, is to be used in the decision-making process. At a mini-
mum, the cases on adequacy of the EIS and EIR make it clear that
NEPA and CEQA are full disclosure laws. The following lan-
guage is somewhat typical of that used in federal cases considering
the question:
The 'detailed statement' required by § 102 (2) (c) should, at a mini-
mum, contain such information as will alert . . . [interested per-
sons], to all known possible environmental consequences of pro-
posed agency action. Where experts, or concerned public or pri-
vate organizations, or even ordinary lay citizens, bring to the atten-
tion of the responsible agency environmental impacts which they
contend will result from the proposed agency action, then the §
102 statement should set forth these contentions and opinions even
86. See supra note 46.
87. San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of San Francisco,
48 Cal. App. 3d 584, 595, 122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 107 (1975); however, a study
which was not intended as an EIR may not be used to fill the void, at least
if it lacks any of the essential elements. Environmental Law Fund, Inc.
v. Town of Corte Madera, 49 Cal. App. 3d 105, 122 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1975).
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if the responsible agency finds no merit in them whatsoever. Of
course, the § 102 statement can and should also contain the opinion
of the responsible agency with respect to all such viewpoints. The
record should be complete. Then, if the decision makers choose
to ignore such factors, they will be doing so with their eyes wide
open.88
But NEPA contemplates more than simply making data availa-
ble. While its language is very general, it does describe a rational
system to be used and clearly intends that agencies:
Utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the envi-
ronmental design arts in planning and in decision making which
may have an impact on man's environment.8 9
Thus, under NEPA the language of the act itself requires the
balancing. Although CEQA does not have such language, we
shall see that the California courts have come to use the same kind
of analysis. Many NEPA cases require that in making decisions
there must be a systematic balancing of environmental costs and
technical-economic benefits. The court's role is to assure that
the agency has before it complete information in the form of an
EIS and that the EIS is used in the decision making process. An
important early case, that of Calvert Cliffs', stated:
NEPA requires that an agency must-to the fullest extent possible
under its other statutory obligations-consider alternatives to its
actions which would reduce environmental damage. That principle
establishes that consideration of environmental matters must be
more than a pro forma ritual. Clearly, it is pointless to "consider".
environmental costs without also seriously considering action to
avoid them. Such a full exercise of substantive discretion is re-
quired at every important, appropriate and non-duplicative stage
of an agency's proceedings. 90
The balancing that the cases require is in many ways best
understood as an aspect of considering alternatives. The "do
nothing" alternative, the alternative of the first proposal and all
other reasonable alternatives can more readily be assessed against
each other rather than in the abstract. Clearly, the EIS must
consider all alternatives which are in some sense reasonable. 91
88. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United
States Army, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (1973).
90. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
91. Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975); 1-
291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974).
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Many of the federal cases, and in particular, the Calvert Cliffs'
decision, demonstrate clearly that the courts expect the final EIS to
be a written explanation of why a particular decision was reached.
Adverse environmental costs must either be explained away or a
rationale must be set forth as to why the agency undertaking or
regulating the project is willing to proceed in the face of such costs.
Whatever may be the actual practice under NEPA, when we
turn to CEQA, the studies of the EIR process suggest, as do the
cases shortly to be discussed, that EIRs are not only often factually
inadequate but they also often fail to include the reasoning process
by which the decision was reached. With the EIR, local govern-
ment decision-making bodies are often presented either with an
EIR which does not recommend any decision or with one which
recommends a different decision than the one actually reached. In
practice the EIR is considered along with other data, frequently
presented in oral form at a hearing, and a decision is reached based
upon some combination of factors which may not all be included
within the EIR. Moreover, the EIR may not include the balance
which was struck nor the reasons for the decision in terms of trade-
offs or in any other terms. Yet California opinions and the
CEQA guidlines 92 also point to the need to relate the final EIR to
the actual decision reached.
One of the earliest California cases stated:
[It] should be understood that whatever is required to be con-
sidered in an EIR must be in that formal report; what any official
might have known from other writings or oral presentations can-
not supply what is lacking in the report.93
The only method of gaining an appreciation of the full impact of
this insistence that the rational decision-making process is one not
only of full disclosure but also of a demonstrated consideration of
the matters disclosed by a process of considering and trading off
the adverse consequences is by reading the opinions, but some of
this can be captured from brief excerpts. For example, in People
v. County of Kern, one of the more strongly worded opinions, the
court said that not only must all actual data be included, but that
[t]the policy of citizen input that underlies the act supports the re-
quirement that the responsible public officials set forth in detail
92. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15012 (West 1975).
93. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dis-
trict, 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 706, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197, 203 (1972); the new EIR
was subsequently held adequate, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Coastside County Water Dist., 28 Cal. App. 3d 512, 104 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1972);
see also Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Permit Appeals,
44 Cal. App. 3d 158, 118 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1974).
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the reasons why the economic and social value of the project, in
their opinion, overcomes the significant environmental objections
raised by the public. 94
The language of one federal case has been cited several times by
California courts:
Finally, and perhaps most substantively, the requirement of a de-
tailed statement helps insure the integrity of the process of decision
by precluding stubborn problems or serious criticism from being
swept under the rug. A conclusory statement 'unsupported by em-
pirical or experimental data, scientific authorities, or explanatory
information of any kind' not only fails to crystalize issues [citation
omitted] but 'affords no basis for a comparison of the problems
involved with the proposed project and the difficulties involved in
the alternatives.' [Citation omitted] Moreover, where comments
from responsible experts or sister agencies disclose new or conflict-
ing data or opinions that cause concern that the agency may not
have fully evaluated the project and its alternatives, these com-
ments may not simply be ignored. There must be good faith, rea-
soned analysis in response. [Emphasis added.] 95
Language which strongly insists on not only the accumulation of
data but also on the rationalization of the actual decision reached
can be found in Burger v. County'of Mendocino.96 In that case,
the EIR listed many adverse effects, recommended against a devel-
oper's proposed motel and recommended a slightly smaller motel
with certain relocations. The planning department made a similar
recommendation, but also recommended certain further study. Fol-
lowing a public hearing, the County Board by resolution found the
EIR adequate and its own consideration thereof full and adequate.
It further found that the general welfare and the public interest
would best be served by approval without further modification.
The court stated:
Although the resolution recites that the board 'has made a full con-
sideration' of the EIR, it nowhere refers in any way to the adverse
environmental effects clearly pointed out by that report. It no-
where suggests that such adverse effects in fact are non-existent,
nor does it point, even in generality, to overriding economic or so-
cial values of the motel.
94. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 841, 115 Cal. Rptr.
67, 75 (1974).
95. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973) as cited in People
v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 2d 830, 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75 (1974)
and Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Permit Appeals, 44
Cal. App. 2d 830, 841, 115 Cal. Rptr. 490, 498 (1974).
96. Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1975).
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The legislative intent was "that environmental considerations
play a significant role in governmental decision making [citation
omitted] and that such an intent was not to be effectuated by vague
or illusory assurances by state and local entities that the effect of
a project on the environment had been 'taken into consideration'"
(Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 263,
104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 771, 502 P.2d 1049, 1059). This guideline seems
particularly appropriate where a board of supervisors overrides the
adverse recommendation of an EIR, buttressed by like objections
from the county planning department. We do not, of course, sug-
gest that 'findings' must be made with the formality attached to
that term in judicial proceedings, but here there is no hint, however
remote, of any reason for rejecting the adverse recommendations.
Judicial review, specifically provided for, cannot be had in such
a void.
Moreover, there is no evidence to meet the mass of engineering
and other data supporting the EIR. Counsel for the developer did
state to the board that the alternative principally recommended by
the EIR and the planning department was not feasible econom-
ically, and one witness assumed the same, although disclaiming any
experience or expertise in that field. There is no estimate of in-
come or expenditures, and thus no evidence that reduction of the
motel from 80 to 64 units, or relocation of some units, would make
the project unprofitable. 97
These cases demonstrate the need to balance environmental costs
against other costs. CEQA itself does not directly prescribe this
balancing process, although it does make a somewhat vague refer-
ence to the need of all government agencies at all levels of govern-
ment "to consider qualitative factors as well as economic and
technical factors and long-term benefits and costs, in addition to
short-term benefits and costs and to consider alternatives to pro-
posed actions affecting the environment."9 8  It also provides that
"major consideration is given to preventing environmental dam-
age." As previously indicated, 9 ) this has caused on California
Court of Appeal to reason that the NEPA cases are of "diminished
value" because of differences in language between NEPA and
CEQA, which the court required greater consideration to be
given to the physical environment, a result also found to be based
upon the legislative history of CEQA. 100
The same case' 0 points out that neither NEPA nor CEQA
require that the balancing to be done must be in the formal style of
a cost/benefit analysis, citing several federal cases so holding.
While this technique is used by such federal agencies as the Corps
97. Id. at 326, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
98. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21001 (g) (West Supp. 1976).
99. San Francisco Ecology Center U. City v. City of San Francisco, 48
Cal. App. 3d 584, 590, 122 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1975).
100. Id. at 591, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 104 (1975).
101. Id. at 595, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
S192
[voL: 3: S172, 1976] The Future of E.I.R.s
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
of Engineers, it is so used because of other statutory authority.
Apparently, there has been an increased use of cost benefit analy-
sis, particularly by federal agencies, because the balancing process
suggests that actually quantifying in monetary terms is one way to
"balance" the pros and cons. However, the state of the art has not
developed sufficiently, to permit acceptable certainty as the mone-
tary value of environmental factors. Perhaps the state of the art
will so develop.
That the guidelines to some extent followed the earlier cases and
anticipated the later ones is not surprising; the NEPA cases were
clear. More importantly, there is probably no practical way to
implement the goals of CEQA other than by treating CEQA as
not absolutely mandating no environmental damage-an impossi-
ble task-and as requiring that the negative impacts be given
appropriate weight. Thus, the guidelines provide:
In particular, the major issues raised when the Lead Agency's posi-
tion is at variance with the recommendations and objections raised
in the comments must be addressed in detail giving reasons why
specific comments and suggestions were not accepted, and factors
of overriding importance warranting an override of the sugges-
tions.1 02
The actual use of EIRs falls far short of this judicial ideal. For
example, one study indicates that in only seven percent of the EIRs
studied were favorable impacts described, and these mostly were
for public projects.10 3 To the extent that most EIRs will have
negative impacts and neither the EIR nor any formally approved
document includes the overriding policy considerations, the Cali-
fornia courts would seem forced to enjoin most EIR projects if
faced with an opportunity to do so. This balancing seems to be at
the very heart of why the EIR process has some hope of achieving
rationality, yet it does not seem to be carried out in this spirit.
VIII. PARTICIPATION BY THE PUBLIC AND OTHER AGENCIES
The requirements that adequate data be made available to the
decision maker and that the decision maker use that data is further
demonstrated by the roles which CEQA and NEPA provide for
government agencies and the general public. NEPA requires that:
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102. 14 CAL. ADMiN. CoDE § 15146(b) (West 1975).
103. Ass'Y LOCAL GoV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 44.
"Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal
official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved. '10 4 Copies of the
statement are to be made available to federal, state and local
agencies as well as the public, the President and the Council on
Environmental Quality.10 5 The Ninth Circuit has held that a city
has standing to object to a negative declaration in part because of
the NEPA requirement that it have an opportunity to comment in
an EIS, of which such an entity cannot be deprived.10
The language of CEQA is in some respects permissive rather
than mandatory in this regard:
Prior to completing an environmental impact report, the responsi-
ble state agency shall consult with, and obtain comments from, any
public agency which has jurisdiction by law with any person who
has special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
volved.' 07
The CEQA guidelines make full public participation a "widely
accepted desirable goal."' 08 Prior to, CEQA, participation by the
public was "irregular and limited."' 0 9
The courts' recognition of the positive role that public participa-
tion plays materializes in a number of contexts. It has already
been mentioned that expressions of public concern play an impor-
tant role in making the use of a full EIR rather than a simple
negative declaration desirable; use of the former helps allay the
fears of an apprehensive public. 10 Courts have also recognized
that the public has a right to know what social and economic
factors have overcome environmental objections."' Moreover,
perhaps because of the recognition that a public hearing is itself
not necessarily the most rational process, the draft EIR must be
available to the public well in advance of any public hearing and
the opportunity to make only verbal comment at a single public
hearing would seem inadequate.'1 2
104. 42 U.S.C. 4332(c) (1973).
105. Id.
106. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (1975).
107. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21104 (West Supp. 1976).
108. 14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 15164 (West 1975). See also §§ 15065 and
15085(d).
109. Ass'y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 14.
110. See supra. note 32 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
112. See Russian Hill Improvement Association v. Board of Permit Ap-
peals, 44 Cal. App. 2d 158, 171, 118 Cal. Rptr. 490, 498 (1974) citing several
other cases.
S194
[VOL. 3: S172, 1976] The Future of E.I.R.s
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Public involvement in the process is justified; such involvement
increases the likelihood of accuracy in the development of factual
data and demonstrates the rationality of that process. Public
involvement also has potential political impact in protecting the
environment from unnecessary degradation through the political
processes:
Only by requiring the County to fully comply with the letter of
the law can a subversion of the important purposes of CEQA be
avoided, and only by this process will the public be able to deter-
mine the environmental and economic values of their elected and
appointed officials, thus allowing for appropriate action come elec-
tion day should the majority of the voters disagree. 113
One study has estimated that some sort of public input occurred
either in response to the draft EIR or at a hearing in fifty percent
of the EIRs, which in turn, included twenty-five percent of the
total number of impacts." 4 The same study also reports that of
the identifiable impacts raised in all EIRs, five percent either were
considered for the first time as a result of that input or made more
accurate. 1 5
The courts' desire to have the greatest possible input to protect
general public interest is also reflected in the way that certain
administrative rules have been applied. While it is generally
agreed that failure to raise within a reasonable time before an
administrative agency any objection being raised before a court will
be barred by latches" 6 because of delay or failure to exhaust
administrative remedies," 7 the fact that the objector is asserting a
public interest has caused courts to refuse to apply these doc-
trines. 18 The courts have reasoned that to apply the doctrine
113. People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 842, 115 Cal. Rptr.
67, 75 (1974).
114. Ass'y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 42.
115. Id.
116. Breshnaha v. City of Pasadena, 48 Cal. App. 3d 297, 121 Cal. Rptr.
750 (1975).
117. Running Fence Corp. v. Superior Court of Calif., County of Sonoma,
51 Cal. App. 3d 400, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1975); Concerned Citizens of Palm
Desert v. Riverside Court Board of Supervisors, 38 Cal. App. 3d 257, 113
Cal. Rptr. 328 (1974).
118. Environmental Law Fund, Inc. v. Town of Corte Madera, 49 Cal.
App. 3d 105, 122 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1975); People v. Department of Housing
and Community Development, 45 Cal. App. 3d 185, 119 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1975).
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would impute to the general public the alleged "fault" of the
particular objector.
IX. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN ACHIEVING THE POLICIES OF CEQA
A. The Theoretical Framework for Governmental Decision Mak-
ing
Students of public administration and political science who seek
a model for understanding political decision-making sometimes
contrast a rational or lineal model with an equilibrium, political or
"clout" model.119 The former assumes a decision making process,
usually with relatively centralized authority, which allows for goal
setting, fact gathering, adequate evaluation of alternatives (some-
times in the form of cost/benefit analyses), a rationally derived
decision and re-evaluation by feedback. The latter assumes that
sufficient data could not be gathered; that causes and effects are
too complex to be understood; that centralized power is undesir-
able, impractical and likely to become self-serving and bureaucrat-
ic; and that compromises among competing interests, each with
some political power, will ultimately produce the "better" decision.
The EIR/EIS process combines both approaches. As a rational
model, it seeks accurate data and a reasoned choice among under-
standable alternatives. As a political model, it seeks cooperation
and input from various government and private agencies as well as
from the general public and is recognized as having an inherent
value because of this access. Whether the courts realize it or not,
they have been applying CEQA and NEPA to accomplish both of
these, although in the real world the theoretically distinct models
are by no means that clearly distinguishable. The rational model,
119. Both models assume that government will regulate in a substantial
manner, so the question is how to control and improve the government deci-
sion making process, or at least how to understand it. The author is well
aware of a belief, which is attracting an increasing number of advocates,
as well as evangelists, that application of economic theories suggests that
government regulation is likely to fail to achieve its goals. Instead, the
more or less inevitable result is less "efficiency" and the "minimizing" of
resources. That is not the appropriate forum for a full economic analysis
of CEQA, as applied to private land use regulation. Public choice theorists
will undoubtedly do more of this. Neither of the cited studies of the EIR
process purports to study the full effect of CEQA on the distribution of
wealth. Neither purports to evaluate the extent to which the impacts being
mitigated by EIRs are "externalities". This author assumes that the politi-
cal choice to have public control of land use through the process described
in the article has been made and that the accomplishment of the policies
of CEQA are thus presumed to be desirable. Perhaps a reconsideration in
economic terms will come at a later date.
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at least as seen in the acts in question, depends upon other agencies
and the public generally for its gathering of adequate data and for
its demonstration on the face of the EIR or EIS that the process
was indeed a rational, balancing one. The political aspects of the
process depend at least in part upon the availability of adequate
information in order to be politically effective.
While CEQA and NEPA represent an attempt to improve the
process of decision-making and the content of the decisions made
across a broad spectrum of government agencies and varied types
of decision-making, the court cases demonstrate the frequent fail-
ure to achieve that goal. But the court cases are but the tip of an
iceberg which can only be viewed pessimistically by those who are
basically sympathetic to the goals of CEQA. For exemple, it
appears that agencies which are required to follow the EIR process
in appropriate circumstances are sometimes willing to admit that
they disagree with the desirability of that process. 120 Agencies
which are required to prepare guidelines 121 for governing local
practices have sometimes totally failed to do so or have done so in
such meaningless terms that neither the developer, the public, or
the government itself knows what is expected under the act. 122
Agencies which are supposed to prepare EIRs apparently have
approved projects without EIRs where at least some of the projects
must have had significant impact. As the cases and studies indi-
cate, laws of such broad scope as CEQA did not have an automat-
ic impact upon the decision-making process.
To a large extent the effectiveness of the process depends upon
the bringing of individual lawsuits both in order to clarify legal
responsibilities and to bring home as forcefully as possible to the
particular litigants the extent to which they have failed to live up to
their legal responsibilties. The resources for instituting such law-
suits, however, are limited. One very substantial source of liti-
gation potential is the California Attorney General's power to
120. See for example, CALAFCO Newsletter of the California Association
of LAFCOS, Vol. II No. 4, December 1975 where it is reported that, while
CEQA applies to the government bodies responsible for approving annexa-
tions and incorporations, 15 of the 43 agencies responding recommended that
they be totally exempted and another 10 recommended a qualified exemp-
tion.
121. CAL. ADMI. CODE § 15050 (West 1975).
122. See PPRO, supra note 5 at 111-30.
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enforce environmental legislation by virtue of express statutory
authority to do so.12 3  In fact, the Attorney General12 4 has been
involved with many of the California cases both as a moving party
and as a participant where there is another plaintiff. A county
district attorney may also represent the people against another
agency. 125 Public interest law firms and citizens' groups have also
contributed to the case law which has been so favorable to
CEQA's expansive implementation. However, these groups have
limited resources and cannot supervise the land use decision-mak-
ing process in each and every one of the many local jurisdictions
with power over land use. Should the California Supreme Court
ultimately decide that successful plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys'
fees, this would provide both the funding for additional suits as
well as some additional "clout" because of the threat of such costs.
However, as of this writing the issue is unsettled. Such costs have
been denied with leave to make a proper motion to the trial court
in several of the leading cases.126 The United States Supreme Court
has, however, decided that such fees are not available under NEPA
in the absence of express statutory authority. 27
Most of the NEPA cases have involved public works projects or
specialized regulatory agencies such as those regulating nuclear
power or dredging in public waters. Thus, not only are the land
use decision-makers not faced with realistic threats of litigation,
but even those who seek to avoid lost lawsuits still find that the law
in regard to private land use regulation is very limited and thus
uncertain. Perhaps the Legislature could be asked to provide
funding or state guidance as an alternative method of encouraging
compliance without the necessity of lawsuits.
B. Scope of Review
Even where a lawsuit is brought, court review of the ultimate
substantive decision is a very limited one. As to other issues that
123. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12600-12612 (West Supp. 1976). See Wagoner, En-
vironmental Protection in California; Court Powers of State and Local Gov-
ernment Attorneys, 14 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 296 (1974).
124. See Younger, Environmental Protection in California, Perspective of
the Attorney General, 5 PAC. L.J. 19 (1974).
125. See People v. Department of Housing & Community Development,
45 Cal. App. 3d 185, 119 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1975).
126. Bozung v. Local Agency Form. Com'n of Ventura City, 13 Cal. 3d
482, 531 P.2d 783, 119 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1975); No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 13 Cal. 2d 486, 531 P.2d 783, 119 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975); Dept. of
Public Works v. Bosio, 47 Cal. App. 3d 495, 121 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1975).
127. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240
(1975).
S198
[VOL. 3: S172, 1976] The Future of E.I.R.s
PEPPRDINE LAW REVIEW
have been brought before the court, such as questions of whether
the acts are to be retroactively applied, whether an EIR or EIS
need be prepared at all, and whether adequate data is presented,
the administrative decisions seem to be looked at quite closely by
the court, sometimes without the usual expressions of judicial
reluctance to get involved in evaluating administrative and legisla-
tive processes. For example, one circuit, when faced with uncon-
troverted facts, has said that the trial court's findings of fact in no
way bind the appellate court because, with uncontroverted facts, the
only questions for review are legal ones which are the responsibili-
ty of the appellate court,128 a conclusion with which the dissenting
judge disagreed rather strongly since he believed that the appellate
court was actually also drawing factual inferences contrary to those
of the trial court. But if there are contradictions, the decision to
use only a negative declaration has been sustained as being sup-
ported by "substantial evidence," thus leaving the resolution pri-
marily to the decision-making local government agency. 129 How-
ever, the abuses to which the courts have been addressing
themselves are normally treated as being relatively extreme abuses
and thus the review may be of limited scope. Once the statement
is adequate both in terms of data and its demonstrated balancing
and rationalization process, the scope of review will clearly be
limited.
A leading federal case has pointed out that
[R]eviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision
on its merits, . . . unless it be shown that the actual balance of
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values.1 30
Most of the federal cases considering the scope of review neces-
sary for a final decision trace their conclusions back to a pre-
NEPA United States Supreme Court holding that the reviewing
court must determine whether the agency acted within the scope of
its authority and that it must find
[TIhat the actual choice made was not arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5
128. Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 48
Cal. App. 3d 534, 122 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
129. Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Arcadia City Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712,
117 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1974).
130. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (Supp. V). To make this finding the court
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error
of judgment .... Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow
one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.13 1
Despite some questions about the 8th 'Circuit's position, which
has suggested a broader standard of review,l s 2 the federal cases are
coming into general agreement that the review is indeed the limited
one described above.13 3 Even when the court states that the scope
of review of the EIS is a limited one, the detail with which the
court actually reviews the EIS may suggest that the court is in
reality substituting its own judgment for that of the agency. Nec-
essarily if there is a long record, the court has had an opportunity
to look at the matter completely. Presumably, however, the court
does indeed exercise the restraint which it claims, as witnessed by
the fact that there may be no cases yet in which an actual substan-
tive decision has been reversed on the merits as being an abuse of
discretion or in which the court has itself imposed conditions or
alternatives to an approved action, although there have been many
chances to do so. The closest thing to an actual review on the
merits may be a recent consent decree where, following two years
of litigation, highway officials agreed to abandon forty-four of a
highway's original fifty-eight miles where objections had been
raised by environmentalists and commercial fishing interests be-
cause of the highway's possible effects on wetlands.18
4
In California, CEQA itself provides the standard for review:
In any such action, the court shall not exercise its independent
judgment on the evidence but shall only determine whether the
Act or decision is supported by substantial evidence in light of the
whole record.'8 5
CEQA further defines the standard for judicial review by incor-
131. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971).
132. See Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. Corps of Engineers, 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
133. The following cases are among the many that have considered the
issue: Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir.
1973); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyoming Council
v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F.
Supp. 223 (D. Conn. 1974); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 223 (W.D.
Tex. 1973); Fayetteville Area Chamber of Commerce v. Volpe, 386 F. Supp.
572 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
134. Ecology Center of Louisiana v. Coleman, summarized in 6 ENV.
Rpm., CuRRENT DEV. 1654 (1976).
135. CAL. PuB. REs. CoDE § 21168 (West Supp. 1976).
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poration of provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides in part that the inquiry
shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded
without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial;
and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse
of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in
the manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported
by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evi-
dence.186
Numerous California cases have not held that the scope of review is
a limited one. This includes the scope of review of the decision to
use a negative declaration rather than a full EIR.1' 7
So far, California appellate courts have not found any abuse of
discretion requiring reversal or modification of a decision which is
otherwise based upon an adequate EIR. As with the NEPA cases,
in all of the cases where the decision makers have been reversed or
enjoined, there have been abuses of the process rather than sub-
stantive abuses.
C. Conflicts with Social Value
If it is sensible to consider environmental tradeoffs before deci-
sions are made, it is equally sensible to more formally recognize the
practice of including social, economic' 38 and even psychological
tradeoffs in the same decision-making process. To the extent that
the purpose of CEQA is to achieve a rational decision-making
process through which the decision maker is made consciously
aware of the quantifiable and qualitative environmental advantages
and disadvantages in choosing among alternatives, it is equally
reasonable to maximize the extent to which that same decision
maker is aware of other consequences and tradeoffs involved in the
same decision. CEQA seeks representation from the public, private
individuals and other agencies so that each may contribute to
the decision-making process. It seems equally appropriate that the
spokesman for other than physical environmental values should
136. CAL. CODE OF Crv. PRO. § 1094.5 (West Supp. 1976).
137. See Running Fence Corp. v. Superior Court of Cal. City of Sonoma,
51 Cal. App. 3d 400, 418, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339, 352, (1975).
138. See Comment, The Compatability of Economic and Environmental
Objectives in Government Decision Making, 5 PAC. L.J. 92 (1974).
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have an opportunity to be heard. Environmental advantages may
frequently be achieved at the cost of not only employment arising
from a project which may be rejected or cut back, but also at the
long-term cost of lost employment that the completed project might
provide. Environmental considerations may be used deliberately
to exclude low income families' 0 in that the result of environmen-
tally imposed limitations upon housing may create housing scarci-
ties and thereby increase the cost of the housing. Particularly in
the consideration of alternatives might lie the acceptance of those
projects which are most likely to provide environmental protection
as well as certain other social economic needs. A multiple assess-
ment system has been recomended by others as well. 140
It is not surprising, in this context, that a number of cases
involve civil rights groups and environmental groups on opposite
sides of the same issue. For example, the Audubon Society seek-
ing to preserve a wetland has found itself at odds with a local
N.A.A.C.P. seeking permanent jobs for 10,000 employees. 141
Since such conflicts can be expected to increase, the courts and the
Legislature will have to resolve them.
D. The Energy and Economic Crises
Congress exempted the Alaska pipeline from NEPA in order to
expedite a partial solution to the "energy crisis" but chose not to
modify NEPA itself, so NEPA may withstand, at least over the
short haul, further pressure to eliminate it or to cut back on its
effectiveness in providing environmental protection. While CEQA
has withstood pressures within the Legislature to change it radical-
ly, the current situation suggests that it could go either way. Cost
consciousness and the general economic situation can be expected
to put additional strain upon the attempts to protect the physical
environment. Perhaps CEQA is sufficiently entrenched and pru-
dently used by all concerned so that it can withstand such pres-
sures. Attempts to assess its actual impact both in terms of cost
and delays are modest. Admittedly, it is not possible to separate out
the costs and delays attributable to CEQA from those that are
attributable to general economic conditions, high interest rates and
resulting scarcity of funds for further development, seemingly dis-
proportionate increases in costs in the construction business, other
139. See Daffron, Using NEPA to Exclude the Poor, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS 81 (1975).
140. See PPRO, supra note 5 at H1-3.
141. Florida Audubon Society v. Callaway, 44 ENVIRONMENTAL RPRT.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS at 1648.
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environmental legislation, particularly the coastal zone initiative,
and so on.142 Some of the costs are start-up costs, particularly as
to delays while procedures were developed, so the costs may de-
crease over time. Perhaps more importantly, if the local govern-
ment decision-making process had been a rational, deliberative and
open process under existing procedure, the addition of these ele-
ments into that decision-making process by way of CEQA might
well have caused much less delay and indirect and direct costs. 148
To put it facetiously, it was probably cheaper in the short run to
know little about either what was actually being decided or why.
Whether caused by the necessary process of gathering and evalu-
ating data, by what has been suggested sometimes to be the over-
utilization of CEQA-4 4 or by inefficiencies in government, delays
cost money in both public and private sectors; unless the proce-
dures are streamlined and needless lawsuits can be avoided, even if
the ideal of CEQA was a valid one, it will fall of its own weight.
E. Integration of CEQA into the Land Use Planning Process
It seems to be agreed that there is a combination of over and
under-utilization of the EIR process so that it does need both
judicial and legislative reform. As previously pointed out, one of
the difficulties in the effective use of this particular tool lies in the
fact that it is designed to be applied to so many diverse kinds of
decisions. In the land use area, most of the applications of the
EIR process have been to individual, particular land use decisions.
For example, in cities and counties which prepare some 90 of the
EIRs in the state, a large majority of the EIRs pertain to such items
as tentative tract maps, use permits, variances, grading/site devel-
opment, specific plan approvals, and planned unit or planned
residential development. 145 In each of these decisions, the contem-
plated use will normally be relatively specific or at least it can be
made specific before the discretionary decision is made.
142. See Ass'y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 81.
143. See PPRO, supra note 5 at HI-1 suggesting that if CEQA has cost
more than the Legislature had intended "[m]uch of the added costs are at-
tributable to introducing sound management practices to local government,
not to processing environmental information."
144. Ass'Y LOCAL GOVT COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 47.
145. Id. at 25a, 25b.
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The problem with this kind of a decision is that each one may be
made in isolation, although the cumulative impact of a succession
of similar decisions may be great. Thus, the individual decisions
tend not to take into account some of the cumulative impacts. 1 46
One problem with the EIRs sometimes prepared for individual
projects is that they include a large amount of "boiler plating"; that
is, general statements which are applicable to any project of this
kind or of any project in a particular area. For example, how
many times does the reader of EIRs need to be informed that San
Diego has an arrid, warm climate.
At the other extreme, there are certain kinds of decisions where
the decision maker is not precisely aware of the use to be made of
the property following the decision. For example, this would
include situations in which NEPA has been applied to the ex-
change of government lands for private lands. An EIS is supposed
to be prepared, 147 although it certainly could be argued that the
land, once it becomes privately owned, will be subject to regulation
by a local government entity whose zoning and other land use
regulations will be applied. Only where the precise use is known
will it be possible to assess the impact of the use and then only at
the level of specificity that the known plans include.148
The annexation EIR process poses a similar problem. When
the proponent of the annexation has a specific land use in mind,
particularly where the application describes that use and the gov-
ernment entity has prezoned the area so that it is clear to all
concerned what the use will be, the California Supreme Court has
said in the important Bozung case that the Local Agency Forma-
tion Commission, which is responsible for approving such annexa-
tions, must prepare an EIR partly because its statutory responsibili-
ties include environmental concerns. 149 On the other hand, it has
been found that when a deannexation is proposed and no facts,
alleged or otherwise, suggest that detaching certain property from a
district would result in any changed land use because in both
instances the property is under the land use jurisdiction of the
county, no EIR nor even a negative declaration need be pre-
pared. 10 But these cases are relatively simple. For example, if a
146. See PPRO supra note 5 at III 38839.
147. See supra note 3.
148. For application of CEQA to a lease, see City of Orange v. Valenti,
37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1974).
149. Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm. of Ventura County, 13
Cal. App. 3d 483, 531 P.2d 778, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
150. Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Form. Comm.
of Ventura County, 51 Cal. App. 3d 648, 124 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1975).
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group of citizens wishes to incorporate a particular area of a
county, it may be motivated by a belief that the existing county
regulation provides for too much or for too little development.
Surely in such a circumstance the motivation for the annexation
would be a change in land use pattern and there would very likely
be a change in status quo which would have significant impact
upon the environment. But the agency responsible for preparing
environmental impact reports would be unable to predict with any
substantial degree of accuracy what land use philosophy would
prevail once there was an incorporation and an election of as yet
unknown land use decision makers who then become subject to
new pressures. For this kind of EIR, it is absolutely inevitable that
the data be somewhat soft and, thus, a court would have to exercise
restraint in evaluating the adequacy of the EIR. At the same time,
the EIR can assess with relative accuracy the status quo and ought
to be able to make some general assumptions about the alternatives
of annexation versus incorporation.
A similar problem arises with rezoning which is not part of a
specific change in order to accommodate a particular developer's
plans but is rather rezoning as part of, for example, a general
rezoning. An EIR is required for a rezoning.' 5 ' Such an EIR
may have to be prepared on the assumption that, once the land is
rezoned, it will be used in a manner which is the most adverse
possible use allowable under the zoning. For example, it could
happen that minimum lot size would not be used by all of a
development in the area but that ultimate density would be half
that which might be possible. In order to assess the desirability of
zoning, the maximum adverse density ought to be evaluated, and if
the more reasonable alternative is to have, for example, one-half of
that maximum density, then that alternative ought to be assessed
and ought to be the one adopted. Still, one would expect this kind
of an EIR to be difficult to amend and necessarily somewhat vague.
Yet, the fact of the matter is that once the rezoning occurs, develop-
ment of the land where subdividing is not required does not leave
any discretionary decisions to the local government so that if the
EIR does not adequately assess the impacts at the time of rezoning,
there will never be an adequate assessment.
151. Rosenthal v. Bd. of Supervisors of Los Angeles County, 44 Cal. App.
3d 815, 119 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1975).
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A third area which raises a similar problem is that of the general
plan. Little use is presently made of the EIR process with respect
to general plans.152  Necessarily, the general plan is likely to
project development over a substantial period of time and is likely
to be framed in somewhat general terms. One technique for
handling the general plan problem would be either to use an EIR
with the plan or to actually draft the general plan in the form of an
EIR at a more general level,153 assessing such impacts as the
impact on air quality of the contemplated density in relatively large
areas or the impact of the proposed density upon the supplying of
services over relatively large areas. It is not possible in the general
plan to assess in any precise sense the impacts, let us say, of such
things as grading which as far as the general plan is concerned may
or may not occur. Some propose the adoption of broad and
general EIRs as part of the general planning process and suggest
limiting the EIR for more exact and precise decisions, such as the
issuance of variances or the approval of a subdivision map, to the
immediate and relatively short-term impacts of what is being
done.'54 Perhaps this would mean allocating such things as the air
quality impacts of indirect sources such as residential uses and
shopping centers to the general plan, allocating the evaluation of
air quality of direct sources such as power plants also to the precise
plan and allocating the assessment responsibilities for such things as
grading solely to the EIR in connection with the particular permit.
This kind of process would eliminate the need for repetitively
"boiler plating" those general considerations. It might also help to
alleviate the lack of information that has currently developed about
cumulative impact. But concern has been expressed over this
approach because it is believed that the EIR prepared for a general
plan will be too broad and general and that for the individual
permit too narrow and circumscribed so that there is in either event
a sole consideration of all of the environmental impacts. 15 5 This
criticism may reflect as much a criticism of the state of art of
general planning as it does the application of the EIR process as
such to the general plan.
There is now judicial consideration of the application of CEQA
to the general plan of the county of Los Angeles in a trial court
opinion.' 16  The original plan prepared for the County had
152. Ass'y LOCAL GOV'T COMM. REPORT, supra note 5 at 30.
153. The Guidelines allow either technique. See 14 CAL. ADmnN. CODE
§ 15148 (West 1975).
154. See PPRO, supra note 5 at H1-9.
155. Id. at H1-10.
156. Coalition v. Board of Supervisors, 8 ERC 1249 (1975).
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projected an increased population over twenty years of over 2,000,-
000. That was later reduced to a projected increase of 700,000.
The first plan also provided for a certain amount of area for
absorption of the projected growth. In response to the require-
ment that zoning be consistent with the general plan, a general
plan and a related EIR were accepted by the Board of Supervisors.
The plan doubled the number of square miles available for expan-
sion despite the attending reduction in the projected population
growth. The land available for development was found to be
fifteen times more than the plan suggested could be used by 1990.
The trial court found that there were textual statements which
were not borne out by the adopted maps. For example, agricultur-
al land would be lost by urbanization if the map were followed
although the text of the general plan made statements about the
need to preserve such land. Particular mountainous areas which
were recognized to be "significant ecological areas" by the text of
the plan were nevertheless made subject to extensive urbanization.
Based upon these and numerous other faults, the court found the
EIR to be totally inadequate. One of the biggest problems was
that the court found that the final general plan simply adopted
preexisting zoning and responded favorably to the requests of
individual property owners for particular treatment of their special
property, while failing to respond to objections raised by citizens
groups, individual citizens and the county's own staff.157
Another solution proposed for the problem of inadequate data
and extensive costs has been the development of data banks or
in-house environmental inventories so that information which is
common to multiple projects does not have to be developed each
time. Of course, if the data is moved upward to the general plan
and reference made thereto, it might not be necessary to do the
study each time. If such data banks are to be developed, it has
been argued that they are appropriate only in those areas subject to
extensive development pressures because the acquisition of ecologi-
cal data throughout an entire area could be an expansive proposi-
tion.15 8
157. This raises the interesting question of how much the staff can control
decision makers through the EIR. To answer questions raised in staff re-
view, the decision maker has to come up with its own written reasons for
rejecting staff recommendation. But staff is usually assigned to the draft-
ing responsibilities.
158. See PPRO, supra note 5 at HI-5.
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X. CONCLUSION
Despite difficulties along the way, the courts, the guidelines and
the developing art have been able to resolve many of the operation-
al problems of CEQA. These same sources can continue to
improve the process. With time and experience, local jurisdictions
can be expected to achieve at least the appearance of compliance
with CEQA as interpreted by the guidelines and the courts. Ques-
tions such as what kind of activities require use of an EIR, what
activities can be satisfactorily dealt with through a negative decla-
ration, what activities do not require an EIR because authorized
prior to CEQA's effective date, and what existing environmental
data and projected changes in the environment must be included
within the EIR can be resolved in time and with experience.
Aided to some extent by the guidelines, the courts are develop-
ing a rational decision-making model whereby all significant exist-
ing and projected environmental costs must be acknowledged,
alternative methods of minimizing these costs must be considered,
and a demonstration in writing must be made to show a rational
basis for the final decision which is adopted. Despite the lack of a
clear legislative mandate to do so, this ultimately was the only
direction the courts could go unless they were to give no substan-
tive meaning at all to the strong legislative pronouncements of the
policies and purposes of CEQA. No serious argument can be
made against this basic goal of rational decision-making and the
accompanying demand for public input into that process as well as
public disclosure of both the impacts and the justifications.
Observers will continue to doubt the actual effectiveness of such
grand scale reform of local government decision-making, whether
it be because the costs are too high, the problems too complex or
the decision makers too venal. Legislation cannot change this,
although law suits can in the individual instance. However, prob-
lems which could be worked out within existing legislation, include
those areas in which prediction of environmental effects is difficult,
such as the adoption of general plans, large rezonings, incorpora-
tions and annexations.
The final problem to be solved is that of integrating social and
economic impacts, including tax benefits and costs, into the ration-
al decision-making process. Even this may inevitably become a
more formal part of the process because of the growing insistence
of the California courts and the guidelines that offsetting economic
and social advantages, not achievable by less environmentally ex-
pensive alternatives, be shown to overcome the environmental
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costs. Local governments lack the technical capabilities and the
resources to do this in many instances; 15 9 thus, any steps that can
be taken to reduce costs and to make the process more efficient are
well justified, but losing sight of the goals of CEQA, as herein
interpreted, cannot be justified.
159. Id. at 111-16.
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